When and how communicated guilt affects contributions in public good dilemmas by Wubben, Maarten J.J. et al.
www.ssoar.info
When and how communicated guilt affects
contributions in public good dilemmas
Wubben, Maarten J.J.; Cremer, David de; Dijk, Eric van
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Wubben, M. J., Cremer, D. d., & Dijk, E. v. (2008). When and how communicated guilt affects contributions in public
good dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(1), 15-23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.07.015
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-277551
Accepted Manuscript
When and How Communicated Guilt Affects Contributions in Public Good Di‐
lemmas
Maarten J.J. Wubben, David De Cremer, Eric van Dijk
PII: S0022-1031(08)00138-8
DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2008.07.015
Reference: YJESP 2124
To appear in: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Received Date: 28 September 2007
Revised Date: 10 April 2008
Accepted Date: 23 July 2008
Please cite this article as: Wubben, M.J.J., De Cremer, D., van Dijk, E., When and How Communicated Guilt Affects
Contributions in Public Good Dilemmas, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (2008), doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.
2008.07.015
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers
we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and
review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
                                                                                                                       When and How  1 
Running Head: COMMUNICATED EMOTION, GUILT AND PROVISION POINT 
 
 
 
When and How Communicated Guilt Affects Contributions in Public Good Dilemmas 
 
Maarten J. J. Wubben and David De Cremer 
Tilburg University 
 
Eric van Dijk 
Leiden University – Institute for Psychological Research  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Address correspondence to Maarten Wubben, Department of Social Psychology, 
Center of Justice and Social Decision Making Tilburg (JuST; www.centerofjust.com), P.O. 
Box 90153, 5000-LE Tilburg, the Netherlands, E-mail: m.wubben@uvt.nl, Fax: 00 31 13 466 
2067.  
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
                                                                                                                       When and How  2 
Abstract 
Two laboratory studies investigated how groups may deal with the strong emotions that 
social dilemmas often elicit. A first study showed that a new group member evaluated guilt 
communicated by a fellow group member as more instrumental than neutral emotion 
feedback when the amount of required resources to obtain the public good (i.e., provision 
point) was perceived as difficult to obtain. A second study revealed that participants use 
communicated guilt to draw inferences about both past and future contributions from all 
fellow group members. Participants also contributed more themselves and adhered to equality 
more often when guilt versus no emotion was communicated, but only when the provision 
point was high. Expected contributions from fellow group members mediated this effect. 
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When and How Communicated Guilt Affects Contributions in Public Good Dilemmas. 
People interacting in groups sometimes find that their individual interests conflict 
with the collective interest. Individuals may be tempted, for example, to refrain from 
investing time, energy, or resources in a team project, so they may free-ride on the efforts of 
others. If, however, each individual follows this strategy, the team project will inevitably fail 
and all will be worse off than if they would have cooperated. This type of mixed-motive 
situation is referred to as a social dilemma, or—more specifically—as a public good dilemma 
(for reviews, see Pruitt, 1998; Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). Often, public goods can 
only be provided when the total amount of contributions surpasses a certain threshold or 
provision point. Such instances are known as step-level public good dilemmas and will be the 
focus of the present research.  
 In step-level public good dilemmas it is important for people to display cooperation 
by means of coordinating their individual contributions so that they do not squander 
resources in an attempt to reach the provision point. A generally preferred solution to this 
coordination problem is for each group member to contribute an equal share of the provision 
point (Lutz, 2001; Messick, 1993). Indeed, because this so-called equality rule is both fair 
and efficient (Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2005), it is an effective coordination 
principle that is frequently adhered to or at least used as an anchor to base one’s eventual 
contributions on (Allison, McQueen, & Schaerfl, 1992; Samuelson & Allison, 1994; Van 
Dijk & Wilke, 1995).  
For an individual group member, using the equality rule to coordinate contributions is 
only effective when the other group members can be expected to act in a similar way. One 
therefore needs to be responsive to cues from other group members that may signal their 
intentions to cooperate, especially when one is a newcomer to a group and thus lacks 
information about previous social dilemma interactions. One cue that people entering an 
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existing group may pay attention to, and one that has been neglected by social dilemma 
research so far, is how the group members feel about past decisions. An interesting 
illustration that affect about past decision behavior within the group may be present and thus 
can be used by group members to base their inferences and decisions on is provided by 
Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee (1977; see also Xiao & Houser, 2005). They noted that after 
playing a social dilemma “one of the most significant aspects of this study did not show up in 
the data analysis” (p. 7) thereby referring to the observation that it was not unusual for 
participants “to become extremely angry, or to become tearful” (p. 7) at other participants 
who had defected. In fact, these authors even note that the affect level was so high that they 
were unwilling to run any intact groups because of the effect the game might have on the 
members’ feelings of each other. 
In the present research we therefore aim to answer two questions. First, when will 
group members’ display of emotions such as guilt be considered as useful or informative in 
determining decisions to contribute, or—as we prefer to define it in the present paper—when 
will it be evaluated as instrumental (Experiment 1)? Second, how will this emotional display 
affect contributions and the use of the equality rule in public good dilemmas (Experiment 2)? 
In the present paper, we will first claim that emotions can serve as important cues to base 
decisions on. Second, we will reason that such cues will be most functional when 
coordination is needed the most. Thus, we will develop the argument that communicated 
emotions are most instrumental when it is relatively difficult to achieve the public good (i.e., 
high provision point). 
Emotional Displays in Social Dilemmas 
 A large quantity of research has addressed what exactly an emotion is. Accordingly, 
emotions can be defined as: “episodic, relatively short-term biologically based patterns of 
perception, experience, physiology, action, and communication that occur in response to 
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specific physical and social challenges and opportunities” (Keltner & Gross, 1999). However, 
scholars have also started to focus on the potential of emotions to regulate and coordinate 
social interactions (i.e., a functional account; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Gross, 
1999; Oatley & Jenkins, 1996).  
The idea that communicated emotions may convey certain intentions which one may 
subsequently take into account for one’s own actions has been convincingly demonstrated by 
Van Kleef, De Dreu and Manstead (2006; see also De Cremer, Wubben, & Brebels, in press; 
Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). These authors showed 
that when a negotiation opponent communicated guilt, people were unlikely to concede 
because they expected their opponent to be willing to make up for his or her tough demands 
that were offered in previous rounds (Van Kleef et al., 2006). Even more important for the 
present paper, very recent research has provided first evidence that in step-level public good 
dilemmas emotions communicated by fellow group members shape a third party’s justice 
judgments of the group, which subsequently affect this person’s preferences for structural 
change (Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, in press). Thus, the information that 
communicated emotion conveys about fellow group members’ intentions may be expected to 
also influence a third party’s contribution decisions and use of the equality rule. 
Communicated Guilt as a Coordination Means in Step-Level Public Good Dilemmas 
What do people entering an existing group wish to know in a public good dilemma? 
They are probably interested in how previous social dilemma interactions have developed and 
whether or not the other group members can be expected to cooperate in the future. Emotions 
communicate such inferences. In the present article we focus on communicated guilt. We do 
so because people often evaluate social dilemmas in terms of morality (e.g., Van Lange & 
Kuhlman, 1994), and guilt is the emotion that is experienced after “having transgressed a 
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moral imperative” in the past (Lazarus, 1991, p. 240; see for applications of guilt in social 
dilemma settings e.g., Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen, Dijker, & De Vries, 2007). 
What do we infer if we see that a particular member communicates guilt? The 
communication of guilt may simultaneously generate inferences about the person displaying 
guilt and the other persons in the group. In a public good dilemma people may first of all 
conclude that the member who communicates guilt has not contributed enough to the public 
good. And if not contributing to the public good in a previous decision round leads a group 
member to feel guilty, a newcomer may infer that there must have been a well-established 
norm of cooperation to which the other group members did adhere. That is, if one’s fellow 
group members would have refrained from cooperating as well, there would be no norm 
prescribing cooperation and not contributing to the public good would therefore be no reason 
to experience guilt. Guilt may therefore not only signal that the person displaying guilt did 
not contribute, but also that the other persons in the group did cooperate. Thus, whereas at 
first sight guilt merely indicates the presence of a repentant transgressor, other group 
members may indirectly profit from this emotional display because it may lead third parties 
to evaluate them as prosocial. 
So how do these inferences affect the expectations regarding the future? From a 
functional perspective, guilt signals appeasement (Barrett, 1995; Keltner & Buswell, 1997). 
As such it is associated with an intention to repair the damage that one has inflicted to a 
relationship (Baumeister et al. 1994, Lewis, 2000). Guilt therefore leads to increased 
prosocial behavior, including helping, making amends, compliance and cooperation 
(Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Regan, Williams & Sparling, 1972; Van 
Kleef et al. 2006). A person communicating guilt therefore signals the willingness to 
contribute to the public good in the future. And because guilt may also signal that the other 
group members are willing to contribute, a third party may infer that all fellow group 
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members intend to cooperate in the upcoming decision round. Thus, even though guilt 
suggests collective failure in the past, people may infer that their fellow group members aim 
to reach the provision point in the future. 
 The main question in Experiment 1 which we alluded to earlier (i.e., when do 
newcomers find communicated guilt instrumental in determining their contribution 
decisions?) is thus related to the question “When do people find it instrumental to know that 
one’s fellow group members can be expected to cooperate?” The answer is not immediately 
clear, because having information about fellow group members’ intentions will not always be 
required to determine how much one should contribute to the public good in order to reach 
the provision point (cf. Van Vugt & De Cremer, 2002; Wubben et al., in press, for similar 
accounts of instrumentality). In fact, even without receiving emotion feedback it is quite 
common for people to expect others to adhere to equality (Allison et al., 1992; Samuelson & 
Allison, 1994; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995). Communicated guilt may therefore primarily 
facilitate coordination under circumstances where people would anticipate that their fellow 
group members might not cooperate. Under such conditions, people may feel that their own 
contributions may be wasted. In step-level public good dilemmas, the anticipation that others 
may not contribute such that own contributions may be wasted, is referred to as fear 
(Rapoport & Eshed-Levy, 1989). It has been shown to be particularly prevalent when the 
provision point increases to more than 60% of group members’ total endowments (Poppe & 
Zwikker, 1996). Indeed, under such circumstances efficient coordination is impeded because 
people’s actual contributions do not rise accordingly, making not only that the public good is 
provided less often but also that more resources are wasted by those who did contibute 
(Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992). Therefore we reason that only when the provision point is high 
the display of guilt may be evaluated as more instrumental than neutral emotion feedback, 
because only then there is substantial fear that communicated guilt may help reduce.  
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Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to test if communicated guilt is particularly instrumental 
in deciding how much to contribute when the provision point is perceived as difficult to 
obtain. That is, as a first test of our hypothesis we used a subjective evaluation of a fixed 
provision point to investigate the potential importance of communicated guilt for decision-
making in step-level public good dilemmas. Thus, we asked participants to what extent they 
felt that many chips were required to reach the provision point and, subsequently, how 
helpful and useful they considered the emotion feedback from a fellow group member to be. 
Using a separate first study for only these critical inferences allowed us to measure perceived 
instrumentality directly without unintentionally influencing participants’ contribution 
decisions. 
Method 
Participants and experimental design. Participants were 47 undergraduate students 
(17 men and 30 women, average age = 18.79 years, SD = 0.95) who participated voluntarily 
in exchange for course credits or a monetary award of 3 (approximately $4). The study 
consisted of an Emotion (guilt vs. neutral) × Judgment of provision point level (continuous) 
between-participants design. Participants were randomly assigned to the emotion conditions. 
Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were divided into groups of 
three and were placed in front of a computer in three adjacent individual cubicles. It was 
explained that the experiment was about “taking decisions in groups” and that all interactions 
between group members would take place via the computer. 
After being seated, participants were informed that two group members would 
immediately start one trial of making decisions in groups, while one group member would 
join the others in round two as a newcomer. Although participants believed that the computer 
assigned the role of newcomer at random to one of the group members, in reality the 
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participant was always the newcomer. Furthermore, the participant was denoted by the letter 
B, whereas the other two persons would be known as group member A and C. While group 
members A and C were allegedly playing the first trial in a public good dilemma, the 
participant was requested to fill out a short individual filler task. Next, the nature of the 
public good was explained. Participants were told that sometimes personal interest and 
collective interest are at odds and that they and their group members would be placed in such 
a situation. It was mentioned that when the participant joined the other two group members, 
the game would be transformed from a two-person to a three-person game. Each group 
member would receive 200 chips and had to decide how many chips to contribute to the 
group. We set the provision point at the intermediate level of 50% (Poppe & Zwikker, 1996). 
Thus, if 300 or more chips were contributed in total to the group, each group member would 
receive 280 chips, regardless of their own contributions to the group. Thus, if the threshold 
was reached, each participant would receive the bonus of 280 chips plus the chips he or she 
decided not to contribute. However, if the provision point of 300 chips was not reached, no 
bonus would be given and participants would only have the chips that they had decided not to 
contribute. 
Because we were interested in exploring the influence that participants’ subjective 
evaluation of the difficulty to establish the provision point could exert on how instrumental 
participants considered the communicated emotion information to be (see below), we asked 
them directly to what extent they felt that they had to contribute many chips to obtain the 
bonus (1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree). 
Manipulation. We manipulated communicated emotion by providing participants with 
emotion feedback from the participants who had allegedly played a trial in a public good 
dilemma already. To enhance the credibility of this manipulation, participants were requested 
to fill out a printed form with three questions that had just been brought in by the 
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experimenter. First, participants had to indicate whether they were participant A, B or C. 
Second, they had to fill out whether they were a newcomer or had already been taking 
decisions for one round. For the third and last question it was made very clear that it should 
only be answered by participants who in the second question had indicated not to be a 
newcomer. It read: “How do you feel with respect to how the contributions to the collective 
pool are developing?” All participants correctly indicated that they as group member B were 
a newcomer and subsequently they all left the third question unanswered, as was instructed. 
Next, they were asked to contact the experimenter who let them wait for a few minutes until 
everybody had filled out their form. When eventually all three group members were ready, 
the experimenter would open the doors of the three adjacent cubicles simultaneously and 
instruct the group members collectively. Thus, a situation was created in which the subjects 
could not see each other, but all could see the experimenter. The experimenter explained that 
he would collect all forms, complete a few administrative tasks and would then redistribute 
the forms. A minute after each participant had handed over his or her form, the experimenter 
reopened the three cubicles one at a time to ask each participant separately if it was correct 
that he or she would be the newcomer in the upcoming trial. When participants confirmed 
this, he delivered them a bogus form that was exactly similar to the one the participant had 
filled out, but with different answers to the three questions. The question “which group 
member are you” was answered with “A” and it was indicated that the fellow group member 
who allegedly filled out the form was not a newcomer, but had already been taking decisions 
during the first round. The communicated emotion was manipulated by means of the third 
answer. The question “How do you feel with respect to how the contributions to the 
collective pool are developing?” was answered with either “I feel rather guilty about these 
contributions” in the guilt condition or with “I don’t really have a pronounced feeling about 
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these contributions” in the neutral-emotion condition. Subsequently, the dependent measures 
were administered. Finally, participants were debriefed, paid and thanked1. 
Dependent measures. To assess whether participants considered the communicated 
emotion to be instrumental in determining their contributions, we used two items. More 
precisely, we asked them to indicate to what extent they considered what member A wrote 
about his or her feelings to be “useful” and “necessary information” to help determining how 
much to contribute. (i.e., “I find what group member A has written about his or her feelings 
necessary to determine accurately how many chips I should contribute” and “The form that 
has been filled out by group member A helps me to determine how many chips I have to 
contribute”; 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree). These two items were averaged into a 
measure of instrumentality of communicated emotion (r = .69, p < .001). To check the 
effectiveness of the emotion manipulation, we presented participants with a variety of 
emotions—including the focal emotion guilt—and asked them to what extent they believed 
participant A experienced this emotion (1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree; cf. Tiedens, 
2001).  
Results and Discussion 
 Manipulation checks. To check the effectiveness of the emotion manipulation, the 
item measuring to what extent the participants perceived group member A to feel guilty was 
submitted to a one-way ANOVA, revealing a main effect of emotion. When group member A 
had communicated guilt, participants reported this person to feel more guilty (M = 6.33, SD = 
1.35) than when no emotion had been communicated (M = 3.27, SD = 1.08); F(1, 45) = 
74.61, p < .001, η² = .62.  
 Instrumentality of communicated emotion1. To analyze when participants perceived 
the communicated emotion to be most instrumental, we first centered the scores on the item 
measuring to what extent participants judged the provision point to be high (Cohen, Cohen, 
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West, & Aiken, 2003). We also effect-coded the emotion variable by assigning the value -1 to 
the guilt condition and the value 1 to the neutral condition. Next, a hierarchical regression 
analysis was conducted in which the instrumentality of the communicated emotion was 
predicted by the main effects of emotion and judgment of provision point level in step 1 and 
the product of these two variables in step 2. 
 As predicted, the analysis revealed a significant interaction term between emotion and 
judgment of provision point level ( = -.31, p < .05). To further explore this effect, we plotted 
the interaction using the predicted means one standard deviation above and below the mean 
of the measure of judgment of provision point level (for high and low scores on judgment of 
provision point level, respectively). These means are presented in Figure 1. Subsequent 
simple-effect analyses revealed that when the provision point was evaluated as difficult to 
obtain, communicated guilt was considered more instrumental than neutral emotion feedback 
in determining how much to contribute ( = -.50, p < .05). On the other hand, when 
participants felt they did not need to contribute many chips to reach the provision point, no 
such difference emerged ( = .13, p = .55). 
 Experiment 1 can be regarded as a first test of the idea that emotional information 
from fellow group members is not always regarded as useful information to employ in one’s 
decision behavior. Indeed, the results provide supportive evidence for the idea that people 
entering the group value and desire emotional information more when they estimate the 
provision point as difficult to reach. These findings should be interpreted with caution, 
however, for two reasons. First, we did not manipulate the provision point level but used a 
subjective evaluation of the difficulty to reach the provision point. Second, we measured 
perceptions instead of behavior to assess the instrumentality of the communicated emotion. 
The results of Experiment 1 nevertheless suggest that effects of communicated guilt can be 
expected to become manifest only when the provision point is high.  
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Experiment 2 
 Having established when emotion information will probably be most instrumental in 
providing the public good and thus when effects of communicated guilt can be expected to 
occur, we moved on to test our second research question, that is, will communicated guilt 
affect a third party’s inferences and contribution decisions and, if so, how? To this end, we 
assessed not only people’s inferences about previous events that caused their fellow group 
member to feel guilty, but also measured contribution decisions and contribution expectations 
at different levels of the provision point. In addition we now manipulated the provision point. 
More precisely, in the low-provision-point condition we set the threshold to a mere 35%, but 
in the high-provision-point condition we set it at 70%; a level at which fear is typically 
important (Poppe & Zwikker, 1996; Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992). 
 In our introduction we already theorized which inferences people may make when 
they learn that a member communicates guilt. In experiment 2 we will actually measure these 
inferences about the previous and upcoming decision round to test our hypotheses. Because 
we will not provide participants with specific information of how high the provision point in 
the first round was (see below), we hypothesize that participants’ inferences of their fellow 
group members’ previous contributions are based only on the emotion manipulation. More 
specifically, as explained before, we first expect that when a person communicates guilt in a 
public good dilemma, a newcomer to the group will infer that this person has contributed less 
in the previous decision round than the other group member (Hypothesis 1a). In line with this 
hypothesis, we predict that a person communicating guilt will also be inferred to have 
contributed less than when this person would have communicated no emotion (Hypothesis 
1b). As a result, a newcomer may conclude that it is less likely that the public good has been 
provided in the previous trial when guilt as opposed to no emotion is communicated 
(Hypothesis 1c). Finally, a newcomer may infer that when a group member communicates 
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guilt, the other person in the group has made higher contributions than when a group member 
communicates no emotion (Hypothesis 1d). 
As alluded to earlier, the emotional display of guilt also allows one to draw inferences 
about contributions in the upcoming decision round. As for the person who communicates 
guilt one may wonder to what extent this person will actually make up for his or her 
violation. In this regard it seems that guilt merely signals an intention to repair a detrimental 
action and not so much an intention to overcompensate it (Baumeister et al. 1994). Therefore 
we predict that a person communicating guilt will be expected to increase his or her 
contributions compared to the previous round. In that case, this person can be expected to 
restore his or her cooperation to the same level as a person who provided only neutral 
feedback. A third party may therefore expect a person communicating guilt to increase his or 
her contributions compared to the previous decision round so that an effect of communicated 
guilt versus no emotion on expected contributions in the upcoming decision round will not 
emerge (Hypothesis 2a). As for the other group member, one may infer that this person has 
already displayed a willingness to cooperate—something that is not so obvious when no 
emotion is communicated. A newcomer may then infer that this group member can be 
expected to cooperate again in the upcoming decision round, even when the provision point is 
high. Thus, we predict that this person will be expected to contribute when the provision 
point is low, regardless of the emotion that is communicated, while in the high-provision-
point condition this person will be expected to contribute more when guilt as opposed to no 
emotion is communicated (Hypothesis 2b). The total expected contributions of both fellow 
group members together, then, will yield a similar interactive effect of emotion and provision 
point (Hypothesis 2c). 
How will these favorable expectations about fellow group members’ contributions 
when guilt is communicated affect a newcomer’s own contributions? A prevalent reason not 
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to contribute to a public good dilemma consists of the fear that one’s resources are wasted if 
others refrain from contributing (Parks & Hulbert, 1995; Rapoport & Eshed-Levy, 1989). 
This fear is especially dominant when the provision point is high (Poppe & Zwikker, 1996; 
Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992). The display of guilt will reduce this fear, however, due to the 
implicit assumption that one’s fellow group members can be expected to cooperate. As a 
result, we expect that newcomers will be cooperative and not fear adhering to equality, even 
when the provision point is high. Thus, an interactive effect of emotion and provision point 
on contributions (Hypothesis 3a) and adherence to equality (Hypothesis 3b) is predicted, such 
that differential effects of guilt and neutral emotion feedback will only emerge when the 
provision point is high. In that case we predict a third party to cooperate more when guilt 
instead of no emotion is communicated. Following this reasoning, we predict that a third 
party’s expectations of his or her fellow group members’ contributions mediate the expected 
interaction between emotion and provision point level on a third party’s contributions 
(Hypothesis 4).  
Method 
 Participants and experimental design. A total of 152 undergraduate students (37 men 
and 115 women, average age = 19.04 years, SD = 1.60) participated voluntarily in exchange 
for course credits or a monetary award of 4 (approximately $5). Participants were randomly 
assigned to a 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) factorial design. 
 Procedure. For this experiment we assigned participants to similar roles as in 
Experiment 1. That is, we again used the letter A to denote the person communicating guilt or 
no emotion, the letter B to denote the participant and the letter C to denote the other group 
member. The emotion manipulation was also kept identical: right before the dependent 
measures were administered the experimenter brought in a manually filled out form with guilt 
or no emotion information that was allegedly written by group member A.  
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Experiment 2 was in two important ways different from Experiment 1. First, 
participants in the high-provision-point condition were introduced to a public good dilemma 
in which they had to contribute 420 chips to reach the provision point. In the low-provision-
point condition, participants had to contribute 210 chips to reach the provision point. Hence, 
if one were to follow the equality rule, one would need to contribute 70 chips in the low- and 
140 chips in the high-provision-point condition. Because each participant had 200 chips 
available, participants had to contribute 35% and 70% to provide the public good in the low- 
and high-provision-point condition, respectively. We also explained that now the participant 
would join the group as a newcomer, the parameters of the game that were used in round one 
were changed. This was done so that participants were unable to determine what the 
provision point in the first decision round had been, allowing us to exclude the possibility that 
our results were influenced by any anchoring effects. 
Second, because participants now had to play a trial in a public good dilemma, a 
financial incentive was introduced to promote the experimental realism of our paradigm (cf. 
Aquino, Steisel, & Kay, 1992). It was explained that the more chips one was able to 
accumulate, the higher the chance to win one of six prizes of 10 (approximately $13). These 
prizes were awarded one week after the experiment. When all instructions about the public 
good dilemma and the emotion feedback were provided, the dependent measures were 
administered.  
 Dependent measures. To understand how the emotion that was communicated by 
group member A would be interpreted with respect to previous events, participants indicated 
on a scale ranging from 1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree to what extent they agreed 
with the following item: “I think that group member A has contributed many chips during the 
first round”. The same question was asked for the third group member, who was known to 
participants as group member C. Participants also had to indicate whether or not they 
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believed that during the first round the public good had been provided. Our main dependent 
measure was the amount of chips that the participant was willing to contribute to the public 
good. In addition, we asked how many chips participants estimated that group member A 
would contribute and how much they estimated participant C to contribute to the public good. 
The provision point level was checked with the following question: “How many chips does 
the group need to contribute, so that the bonus will be disbursed to the group?” The 
effectiveness of the emotion manipulation was checked in the same way as in Experiment 1. 
Results 
 Manipulation checks. Out of 152 participants, 4 participants (2.6%) were unable to 
correctly indicate the provision point level and they were removed from further analyses2. 
The emotion manipulation was checked with a 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) ANOVA, 
revealing only the expected main effect of emotion; F(1, 144) = 246.19, p <.001, η² = .63. 
Group member A was perceived to feel more guilty when guilt (M = 6.45, SD = 1.20) as 
opposed to no emotion (M = 3.31, SD = 1.22) was communicated. 
Inferences about first decision round3. The relevant means for these inferences can be 
found in Table 1. We predicted participants to infer about the first decision round that the 
person communicating guilt had contributed little to the public good, leading them to expect 
that the provision point had not been reached. Therefore we submitted the items measuring 
estimated contributions of group member A and C to a 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) × 2 
(group member) mixed-model ANOVA with the last factor as a repeated-measures variable. 
This yielded main effects of emotion (F[1, 144] = 32.44, p < .001, η² = .18; for guilt M = 
3.27, SD = 0.73; for no emotion M = 3.98, SD = 0.78) and group member (F[1, 144] = 
194.82, p < .001, ηp² = .57; for member A M = 2.86, SD = 1.43; for member C M = 4.42, SD 
= 1.23). These main effects were qualified by a significant Emotion × Group member 
interaction, F(1, 144) = 172.81, p < .001, ηp² = .55. In line with Hypothesis 1a, simple-effects 
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analyses revealed that when group member A communicated guilt, he or she was estimated to 
have contributed less in the first trial than group member C, F(1, 144) = 353.21, p < .001, ηp² 
= .71. This effect did not emerge when group member A communicated no emotion, F < 1, p 
= .56. In addition, two separate 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) ANOVAs on the items 
measuring estimated contributions of group member A and C in the first trial showed two 
main effects of emotion. Supporting Hypothesis 1b, when group member A communicated 
guilt, he or she was believed to have contributed less during the first trial than when no 
emotion was communicated, F(1, 144) = 232.48, p < .001, η² = .62.  
In accordance with Hypothesis 1c, a 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) ANOVA on the 
item measuring to what extent participants believed that the provision point had been reached 
in the first trial, revealed that communicated guilt was believed to indicate a lower probability 
of collective success in the first trial (M = 2.38, SD = 1.20) than when no emotion was 
communicated (M = 3.58, SD = 1.50), F(1, 144) = 28.43, p < .001, η² = .16. 
Finally, the results of a 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) ANOVA confirmed 
Hypothesis 1d. When group member A communicated guilt, group member C was perceived 
to have contributed more than when participants received neutral emotion feedback, F(1, 
144) = 18.11, p < .001, η² = .11.  
Expected contributions. Table 2 shows the means of all expected contributions, 
including the participants’ own contributions. Whereas participants inferred that group 
member A had defected in the first decision round when he or she communicated guilt as 
opposed to no emotion, we also expected this effect to disappear for the upcoming decision 
round (Hypothesis 2a). To show that this effect was specific for group member A and not for 
group member C, we standardized participants’ estimations of group member A and C’s 
contributions in round one and round two using z-scores and conducted a 2 (emotion) × 2 
(decision round) × 2 (group member) ANOVA, with the latter two factors being repeated-
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measures variables. This yielded a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 146) = 86.12, p < 
.001, ηp² = .37. A separate 2 (emotion) × 2 (decision round) repeated-measures ANOVA on 
the estimated contributions of group member C did not reveal a significant interaction, 
suggesting that the reported effect of emotion on estimated contributions in round 1 (see 
hypothesis 1d) was not significantly different in round 2, F(1, 146) = 1.94; p = .17. A similar 
repeated-measures ANOVA on the estimated contributions of group member A, however, did 
reveal a significant interaction of Emotion × Decision round, F(1, 146) = 102.90, p < .001, 
ηp² = .41. Whereas participants inferred that a person communicating guilt had contributed 
less than a person communicating no emotion (as reported when testing Hypothesis 1c), in 
line with Hypothesis 2a this effect of emotion was no longer present in participants’ 
estimation of group member A’s contribution for the upcoming decision round.  
Next, we tested if participants estimated group member C to be cooperative when 
guilt was communicated—even when the provision point was high (Hypothesis 2b)—by 
submitting this group member’s expected contributions for the upcoming decision round to a 
2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) ANOVA. This yielded, first, main effects of provision 
point, F(1, 144) = 65.32, p < .001, η² = .29 and emotion, F(1, 144) = 65.32, p < .001, η² = 
.29. Participants expected higher contributions when the provision point was high (M = 
109.12, SD = 42.41) than low (M = 69.40, SD = 15.87) and when guilt was communicated (M 
= 95.85, SD = 39.87) compared to no emotion (M = 82.68, SD = 34.20). These main effects 
were qualified by a significant Emotion × Provision point interaction, F(1, 144) = 13.00, p < 
.001, η² = .06. In line with Hypothesis 2b, simple-effects analysis indicated that when the 
provision point was high, participants predicted that group member C would contribute more 
when group member A communicated guilt instead of no emotion, F(1, 144) = 18.33, p < 
.001, η² = .08. This effect was absent when the provision point was low (F < 1, p = .43). 
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A 2 (emotion) × 2 (provision point) ANOVA on group member A and C’s total 
expected contributions also yielded the predicted interaction (Hypothesis 2C); F(1, 144) = 
5.91, p < .05, η² = .03. Again, compared to no emotion feedback (M = 198.16, SD = 83.82), 
communicated guilt led to higher expected contributions (M = 238.19, SD = 52.24) when the 
provision point was high, but this effect did not emerge with a low provision point (F < 1, p = 
.79). 
 Contributions. Participants’ contributions were submitted to a 2 (emotion) × 2 
(provision point) ANOVA, revealing main effects of provision point, F(1, 144) = 104.28, p 
<.001, η² = .39 and emotion, F(1, 144) = 9.75, p <.005, η² = .04. Contributions were higher 
when the provision point was high (M = 123.73, SD = 42.32) as opposed to low (M = 72.01, 
SD = 17.93) and when guilt (M = 106.39, SD = 39.17) as opposed to no emotion (M = 89.34, 
SD = 41.92) was communicated. More importantly and supporting Hypothesis 3a, the 
interaction between emotion and provision point was significant, F(1, 144) = 7.09, p < .01, η² 
= .03. Simple-effects analysis revealed that when the provision point was high, participants 
contributed more when guilt was communicated than when neutral emotion feedback was 
given, F(1, 144) = 16.55, p <.001, η² = .06. When the provision point was low, however, this 
effect was absent; F < 1, p = .74.  
Adherence to equality and coordination. Even though these findings seem to suggest 
differences between conditions in adherence to equality, the correct procedure to validate this 
claim would be to test whether there are differences in the frequencies with which group 
members use the equality rule. Thus, participants were classified as following the equality 
rule when they contributed 70 chips and 140 chips in the low and high-provision-point 
condition, respectively. Using these strict criteria4, 62 out of 148 participants adhered to 
equality. To examine this classification as a function of provision point and emotion, a 
hierarchical log-linear analysis was conducted (cf. Van Dijk & Wilke, 2000), revealing the 
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highest order interaction (Emotion × Provision point × Adherence to equality) to be 
significant, ²(1) = 7.47, p <.01. To further explore this interaction, separate chi-square tests 
on the emotion and adherence to equality variables were performed at different levels of the 
provision point. In the high-provision-point condition, there was a significant effect of 
emotion on whether or not participants would adhere to equality, ²(1) = 5.31, p < .05. In line 
with Hypothesis 3b, odds ratios indicated that the odds of adherence to equality when guilt 
was communicated was 3.24 times as high as the odds of adherence to equality when no 
emotion was communicated. When the provision point was low, however, this effect of 
emotion was absent, ²(1) = 2.29, p = .13, odds ratio guilt: no emotion = 0.49:1. 
Mediation analysis. We predicted that participants will use their expectations of both 
group member A and C’s contributions in the upcoming decision round to determine whether 
or not they will contribute to the public good (Hypothesis 4). To examine this mediated 
moderation hypothesis, we decided to adopt a different approach than the one advocated by 
Baron and Kenny (1986). Even though their recommendations to establish mediation are 
widely used, their procedure has also been criticized for a lack of statistical power 
(MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). Moreover, it does not directly test 
the null hypothesis that the indirect effect significantly differs from 0. Another, more formal 
test of mediation that is commonly used, is the Sobel-test. However, this test requires 
distributional assumptions that may not be met in small sample sizes (N < 200; Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). We therefore decided to test for mediation by adopting 
a bootstrap method as advocated by Preacher and Hayes (in press; see also Bollen & Stine, 
1990; Preacher and Hayes 2004; Shrout and Bolger, 2002), which suffers from none of these 
disadvantages.5 
Following Preacher and Hayes (in press), we used bootstrapping to estimate the 
indirect effect of the Emotion × Provision point term on participants’ contributions with the 
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total expected contributions of both group member A and C as mediator, while controlling for 
the emotion and provision point terms. The basic idea of this procedure is to extract n cases 
with replacement from the original sample, and reestimate the size of the indirect effect in 
this new resample. This procedure should be repeated at least 1000 times. If, when using 
standard significance levels of  = .05, the size of the indirect effect in at least 95% of these 
resamples is in all cases either larger or smaller than 0 (as indicated by the obtained 
confidence intervals), the indirect effect is significant. Accordingly, using 10,000 bootstrap 
resamples and bias corrected and accelerated intervals (see Preacher & Hayes, in press), we 
obtained confidence intervals that did not contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., LL CI = -7.23; 
UL CI = -0.11). Thus, the expected contributions of the other group members mediated the 
interaction effect between emotion and provision point on participants’ own contributions (p 
< .01).  
General Discussion 
Taken together, the present results are supportive of the central hypothesis that 
communicated guilt is an important, socially informative cue that people use for their 
decisions to contribute and adhere to equality in a step-level public good dilemma. In 
addition, we identified a structural variable (i.e., provision point) that plays an important role 
in when differential effects of communicated guilt as opposed to neutral emotion feedback 
are particularly likely to emerge. The results show that communicated guilt has effects at 
three separate stages of the decision-making process. It does not only provide information 
about how fellow group members behaved in previous social dilemma interactions, but also 
about how these group members will behave in the future. Ultimately, communicated guilt is 
therefore also instrumental in making one’s own contribution decisions. Below, we discuss 
the most important findings and implications.  
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The first important contribution of this research is that the communication of an 
emotion in a social dilemma is sufficient for people to draw conclusions about previous 
events in a social dilemma. Indeed, the mere communication of guilt readily led people to 
come up with the scenario of a selfish group member who added to collective failure despite 
the cooperative efforts of the other group member. As such the present research further 
emphasizes the salience of concepts such as collective failure and variance in cooperative 
behavior between group members, because even very basic information about how a fellow 
group member feels already revealed very strong effects on inferences that are related to 
these concepts (cf. De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; Samuelson & Messick, 1986). Note that 
obtaining these findings should be accredited to the use of a newcomer paradigm, because 
this required participants to make inferences about previous social dilemma interactions in 
which they did not take part.  
People go beyond this question of which events induced an emotional state in a fellow 
group member, however. The present research shows that people also use information about a 
fellow group member’s emotion as a basis for their expectations of this person’s future 
contributions and even the future contributions of other fellow group members. More 
specifically, the results supported the idea that guilt mainly communicates an intention to 
repair instead of overcompensate one’s detrimental action (cf., Baumeister et al., 1994; see 
also Wubben et al., in press). That is, a person communicating guilt was expected to 
contribute his or her fair share in the future, but not more than that. A possible explanation 
for this finding that a transgressor seems able to get away with merely promising to not 
transgress again may be that the victim of the detrimental action is partly comforted already 
by the knowledge that the experience of guilt is very unpleasant for the transgressor 
(Baumeister et al., 1994; O’Malley & Greenberg, 1983). Our findings suggest a 
complementary explanation however. Experiencing guilt may not only be a punishment for 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
                                                                                                                       When and How  24 
the transgressor, but also a reward for the victim. That is, when a person communicates guilt, 
third parties also seem to evaluate the other group members as more prosocial than when 
guilt is not communicated. This forwards the interesting and paradoxical hypothesis that 
inducing the unpleasant feeling of guilt in a fellow group member may in itself be beneficial 
because it actually allows one to build a reputation of being a cooperator (cf. Hardy & Van 
Vugt, 2006). 
The effects of communicated emotion are not merely limited to inferences about 
fellow group members. The present research also shows that the communication of guilt may 
actually increase one’s own contributions to the public good by inducing people to adhere to 
equality more often. As such these findings respond to the recent call that “research on social 
dilemmas could be significantly improved by examining cooperation [...] as a process driven 
by emotion communication” (Boone & Buck, 2003, p. 176). In this regard it is important that 
participants were told that the person from whom they received emotional information was 
unaware that this information would be communicated to them. The question whether the 
display of guilt also induces cooperation in social dilemmas when strategic motives for 
communication are not excluded therefore remains to be addressed in future research (cf. Van 
Kleef et al., 2006). 
The present research also reveals that differential effects of communicated guilt 
versus no emotion may not always become manifest. Only in situations where people are not 
so sure or even distrustful about their fellow group members’ cooperative intentions may 
communicated guilt increase one’s contributions. Such a situation occurs when the provision 
point is high (as opposed to low). Especially in that case participants fear wasting many 
resources as a result of their fellow group members’ potential failure to assist in contributing 
the high amount of resources that is required to provide the public good. Our findings show 
that in such instances emotion information is evaluated as very useful and valuable 
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(Experiment 1). When the provision point is high, emotional information is useful because in 
the case of communicated guilt it signals that one’s fellow group members may be expected 
to cooperate and thus there is less fear that one’s own contribution is simply a waste of many 
resources. Under circumstances of a low provision point fear of wasting one’s resources is 
less prevalent because the public good is easy to obtain. In fact, under conditions of a low 
provision point there was a nonsignificant tendency for people to evaluate communicated 
guilt as less valuable than no emotion information. Also, when in that case guilt was 
communicated there was a nonsignificant trend for people to deviate from equality more 
often in such a way that they contributed slightly more than necessary. These slight trends in 
the data lead to the interesting suggestion that when a coordination task is easy already, 
additional information may—even when it is favorable—only complicate coordination. This 
will merely cause participants to contribute more than necessary in order to “play it safe”.  
A final important finding of the present research is that the interactive effect of 
emotion and provision point on people’s own contributions is mediated by their expectations 
of fellow group members’ contributions. This suggests that people deliberately consider their 
fellow group members’ expected contributions to decide whether or not they should act in the 
collective interest by trying to reach the provision point. Conversely, it is interesting to note 
that prior research has shown that communicated guilt in two-party negotiations encourages 
people to actually take advantage of their opponent’s expected cooperation by setting higher 
goals for themselves and, subsequently, making less concessions (Van Kleef et al., 2006). 
This apparent controversy is easily reconciled, however. First, the cell means of the expected 
contributions of fellow group members when guilt was communicated indicate that there was 
little opportunity for such strategic mismatching, seeing that participants generally did not 
expect to reach the provision point by contributing less than the equality rule would 
prescribe. Moreover, as opposed to negotiations, the risk/reward ratio for strategic 
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mismatching in public good dilemmas may be perceived as quite high, because contributing 
too little would lead one to irreversibly squander one’s complete contribution. 
Following similar logic, we can provide evidence against two alternative explanations 
for our effects. First there is the possibility that the communication of guilt invokes a 
realization in people that apparently a social dilemma may induce guilt in oneself. This 
anticipated guilt may subsequently lead people to exhibit considerable levels of cooperation, 
even when the provision point is high. A second explanation is that the communication of 
guilt, which is a moral emotion (Tangney, 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2006), makes concepts of 
morality salient, thus encouraging cooperative behavior. First, these two explanations seem 
highly unlikely, because they cannot explain why, as mentioned above, in negotiations 
communicated guilt actually lead people to be less cooperative (Van Kleef et al., 2006). 
Moreover, our finding that people base their contribution decisions on their expectations of 
fellow group members’ contributions is strong evidence for our explanation that 
communicated guilt reduces fear that the provision point will not be reached. This 
mediational role of expected fellow group members’ contributions is less uniquely predicted 
by the alternative explanations of anticipated guilt or activated concepts of morality. 
Before closing, we wish to outline a promising avenue for future research. Seeing that 
communicated guilt is an important emotional cue in social dilemmas, other emotions 
deserve scholarly attention as well. Anger in particular needs mentioning, because it can 
readily be elicited in social dilemmas (Stouten, De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005) and has the 
potential to degrade the whole group to enduring defection (Schroeder, Steel, Woodell & 
Bembenek, 2003). Future research could therefore contribute significantly by focusing on 
preventing the potential escalating effect of communicated anger in social dilemmas. In a 
similar vein, social dilemma literature could be furthered by unveiling how communicated 
emotion may play a role in fostering and maintaining high levels of cooperation. For 
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example, will communicated happiness safeguard cooperation, or will it under some 
conditions actually encourage fellow group members to act more selfishly in the future? 
These questions highlight the necessity to investigate communicated emotion in social 
dilemmas. 
To conclude, an important strength of the present research is that it is the first to show 
in social dilemmas that communicated emotion allows people not only to infer what 
happened in past interactions, but also to predict how their fellow group members will behave 
in the future. These expectations subsequently affect even people’s own cooperative behavior 
in social dilemmas. The scarcity of research in this area is remarkable, given Dawes and 
colleagues’ (1977) observation that it was not at all uncommon for the affect level in their 
social dilemma experiments to skyrocket. Our findings, then, are evidence that an intragroup 
focus—or a focus on emotional displays in particular—is fruitful for better understanding 
how groups may manage social dilemma situations.  
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Footnotes 
1
 Because participants’ subjective evaluation of the difficulty of realizing the public 
good was measured before the emotion manipulation, there was no reason not to assume the 
orthogonality of both variables. Indeed, a one-way ANOVA showed that participants in the 
guilt condition did not find the provision point harder to obtain (M = 4.62, SD = 1.12) than 
participants in the no-emotion condition (M = 4.27, SD = 1.54), F(1,45) < 1, p = .39.  
2 Including these participants in the analyses showed the same pattern of results. 
3 Because the information provided in Experiment 2 prohibited participants from  
making any reasonable estimation of the provision point level in the first decision round, we 
did not expect nor obtained any effects of provision point on these measures.  
4A limitation of using such strict criteria for adherence to equality is that participants 
who deviate only slightly from equality are lumped into the same category as participants 
who deviate heavily. Therefore we complemented this analysis with a 2 (emotion) × 2 
(provision point) ANOVA on the absolute difference between participants’ actual 
contributions and the amount that they should contribute to adhere to equality (i.e., 70 and 
140 chips in the high and low-provision-point condition, respectively; cf. Van Dijk & Wilke, 
2000). The results were in line with the analysis we presented above. We again observed a 
significant interaction, F (1,144) = 17.71, p < .001, η² = .10. Simple-effect analyses showed 
that communicated guilt led people to deviate from equality less (M = 11.67, SD = 16.43) 
than neutral emotion feedback (M = 41.03, SD = 44.63) when the provision point was high, F 
(1, 144) = 23.52, p < .001, η² = .16. This effect was absent when the provision point was low, 
F (1,144) = 1.17, p = .28 (Ms = 13.89 vs. 7.43, SDs = 17.94 vs. 10.37). 
5
 If we were to follow Baron and Kenny’s procedure, we would also arrive at the 
conclusion that group members’ expected contributions mediated the interaction effect of 
emotion and provision point on own contributions, as will be shown here. First, predicting 
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participants’ contributions by entering emotion, provision point and their interaction in a 
linear regression model yielded results that were identical to ANOVA. That is, the same 
interaction effect occurred ( = -.16; p < .01). When these three terms were used to predict 
expected contributions of fellow group members, the results also matched those of the 
reported ANOVA. Again a significant interaction of emotion and provision point ( = -.16; p 
< .05) was revealed. Third, when expected contributions were included as a covariate with 
emotion, provision point and emotion × provision point to predict own contributions, a 
significant effect of expected contributions on participants’ contributions emerged ( = .45; p 
< .001). Finally, and most importantly, in this model the interaction effect between emotion 
and provision point on participants’ contributions disappeared,  = -.09; p = .12. 
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Figure 1.  
The relationship between emotion and instrumentality of communicated emotion as a 
function of judgment of provision point level (Experiment 1). Higher values reflect higher 
degrees of the variable measured. 
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Table 1 
Means and standard deviations on estimations of group members’ contributions in decision 
round one by emotion (Experiment 2).  
 Emotion Dependent Variables 
Guilt Neutral 
Estimated contributions group 
member Aa 
1.69a  
(0.67) 
3.94b 
(1.06)
 
Estimated contributions group 
member Ca  
4.85c  
(1.37) 
4.03b 
(0.93)
 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher contributions. Standard deviations are given in 
parentheses. Means with a different subscript differ at p < .05. 
aGroup member A is the person communicating the emotion; group member C is the other 
fictional person. 
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Table 2 
Means and standard deviations on participants’ and estimations of group members’ 
contributions in decision round two by emotion and provision point (Experiment 2).  
 Provision Point Dependent 
Variables 
Emotion 
Low (210) High (420) 
Guilt 73.26a  
(22.57) 
138.61c 
(20.20)
 
Contributions 
participant 
Neutral  70.93a  
(12.77) 
109.24b  
 (52.44) 
Guilt 70.29a  
(32.13) 
113.75b 
(39.14)
 
Contributions 
group 
member Aa  
Neutral  68.00a  
(18.84) 
103.95b 
 (43.76) 
Guilt 66.43a  
(18.49) 
124.44c 
(33.76)
 
Contributions 
group 
member Ca 
Neutral  72.00a  
(12.85) 
94.22b  
 (45.03) 
Note. Higher scores indicate higher contributions. Standard deviations are given in 
parentheses. Means with a different subscript differ at p < .05 according to simple-effects 
analyses. 
aGroup member A is the person communicating the emotion; group member C is the other 
fictional person. 
